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Alessandra Ciffo
In recent months, insecurity and instability have characterized the
internal contexts of several countries in the Sahel region of sub-Saharan
Africa. Particularly, ongoing criminal activities and recent tensions between
National Security Forces and paramilitary and private groups, such as the
Wagner PMC Group, in contrast with terrorist groups [1]
and those professing Salafist-jihadist [2]
ideologies, such as the so-called Islamic State (IS) wilayat [3] and Al-Qaeda (AQ) groups, whose presence is strongly felt through continuous
military attacks and various forms of illicit activities, further negatively
impact the already fragile and precarious political and economic situations in
the Sahel. On August 20, 2023, a video
lasting approximately 40 seconds circulated on various channels and media, in
which the leader of the Wagner PMC Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, declared increased
active involvement and military deployment of battalions and mercenaries from
the Russian paramilitary group in "reconnaissance and search" [4]
operations in various African countries, renewing his participation in the
fight against terrorist groups, particularly against Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the
Islamic State (IS), and expressing the desire to eradicate terrorism on the
continent by intensifying and encouraging the deployment of Wagner PMC Group
divisions and recruiting new members, especially in activities conducted in
Africa, as reiterated in his recent statements in Belarus on July 20, 2023.
This marks his first appearance, albeit virtual, since the events that saw him
involved in the rebellion and march on Moscow on June 23 of the same year.
Analyzing the data collected during the information monitoring activity, it is
very likely that at the time of these last statements, Prigozhin would have been
in some location in Mali, according to local sources that observed the landing
of an Il-76 from the Russian Emergencies Ministry at Bamako airport, Mali,
carrying the leadership of the Wagner PMC Group. A few weeks before Prigozhin's
statements, hostilities between the Wagner PMC Group and the Salafi-jihadist
coalition Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) [5]
had already intensified, increasing the number and intensity of conflicts
between both parties in terms of material casualties and loss of human lives.
On August 17, concurrently with the conquest of the village of Ber, Mali,
controlled by separatist and qaedist forces, by the Malian army with the
support of the Wagner PMC Group, JNIM officially released a bulletin on Az-Zallaqa
Media [6],
denouncing the continued perpetration of violent systemic attacks, torture, and
criminal activities by mercenary units of the Wagner PMC Group against the
settled populations in this region, citing the most recent cases of attacks on
Muslim villages and ethnic groups [7]
such as Jangoy, Kolongon, Kouwanta, Karbajee, Dikoni, and Semina, in the area
near Tandoko, Banamba, in the Koulikoro province, Mali, destroying, killing,
injuring, and arresting dozens of civilians and members of ethnic groups and
their properties. On August 23, with a new official statement on Az-Zallaqa
Media, JNIM incited the Malian population to mobilize, encouraging them to
actively join in support of their struggle against the Wagner PMC Group and the
Security Forces of Mali, accused of officially conducting these operations
against terrorists or supporters of terrorist groups, despite, according to the
qaedist coalition, among the victims being "women, children, babies, and
unarmed men looted, arrested, and killed without trial or evidence."[8]
Rumors are circulating regarding attempts by qaedist members to negotiate a "ceasefire" with the Islamic State (IS), intending to concentrate forces against the Russian paramilitary group. Such rumors, mentioned and discussed within communication channels of IS groups, are viewed critically by mujahideen[9] and supporters themselves, recalling how JNIM itself began a real fight against IS wilayat and its affiliates operating in the area, since 2020, due to the passage of a certain number of Al-Qaeda members into the ranks of the famous self-proclaimed Caliphate[10]. The strategy of massive use of ground troops undertaken by Prigozhin through the deployment of units of the Wagner PMC Group in the sub-Saharan area, particularly in Mali for the fight against terrorism, de facto began in 2021. During this period, although not formally recognized by any competent Malian authority, the Wagner PMC Group was tasked with conducting anti-terrorism military operations to strengthen the security of the country's transitional government[11], classifying it as a force of "supplétifs" in collaboration with the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa)[12], Dan Na Ambassagou, anti-jihadist militias Dozo in the regions of Mopti and Segou, and, in rare cases, with pro-government militias and Tuareg groups in the regions of Menaka and Gao, Mali. However, the recent events surrounding the declared death of Yevgeny Prigozhin and his second in command, Dimitry Utkine, on August 23 following the crash of the Embraer Legacy 600 jet near the village of Koujenkinou in the Tver region northwest of Moscow, flying from Moscow's Sheremetyevo airport to Saint Petersburg airport, could affect the theaters of conflict involving direct military involvement of Wagner battalions, altering the course of some scenarios in the Sahel region and particularly in the Prigozhinian battle against jihadist groups, which could exploit the impact of the temporary absence of a strong leadership at the top of the organizational chart of the Russian paramilitary militia.
[1] Terrorism, according to the Italian "Glossario Intelligence" of Sistema di informazione per la sicurezza della Repubblica, is the phenomenon in which non-state actors
and/or individuals with or without the support of states indiscriminately use
violence against civilians, institutions, and/or international organizations,
spreading terror and influencing choices and policies. Generally, it is divided
into two major types:
1. Secular Terrorism:
Political and antigovernmental ideological origin, e.g., extreme right-wing
movements, left-wing and anarchist insurrectionary.
2. Ethnic-Separatist
Terrorism: Ethnocultural and religious ideological origin, e.g., separatist
movements (Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in Nigeria), religious factions
(e.g., Jihadists, white supremacists).
[2] Salafi-jihadism is one
of the three currents, alongside Quietist Salafism and Activist Salafism, that
make up Salafism, an active and puritanical reform of Sunni Islam, based on the
rejection of any form of religious modernization and the implementation of
Islamic law (Shari’a). Salafi-jihadists, by pledging Bay'ah (allegiance) to
their leader, advocate armed struggle (Jihād) against "Near Enemies"
(Muslim regimes considered impious and unbelieving) and "Far Enemies"
(Western countries, especially the USA and Israel), to restore the early Islamic movement, rejecting the legitimacy of secular institutions,
and promoting armed revolution, crucial for the creation of a New Caliphate or
Islamic State. Geopolitical crises and the creation of specific theaters of war
developed over the years have led to the emergence of different
ideological-operational interpretations of jihadist thought, which according to
some experts can be distinguished into two major Islamist groups with their own
territorial and non-territorial objectives, organizational structure,
leadership, and operational tactics: Salafi-jihadist (represented by Al-Qaeda)
and neo-takfiri (represented by the Islamic State - IS).
[3] Wilayat is the
plural form of the Arabic term "wilayah," which translates to
"Province." In the context of the Islamic State (IS), it denotes the
status assumed by areas of operations officially recognized by the Islamic
Central (the central leadership of IS).
[4] Utilizzata da
Prigozhin nella sua dichiarazione, che letteralmente si traduce in
“ricognizione e ricerca”, ma che meglio la si può intendere con l’espressione
di “Intelligence, Surveillance,. Reconnaissance (ISR)”, per indicare l’insieme
di attività e capacità militari necessarie nella raccolta di informazioni utili
in termini tattico-strategici, e di sorveglianza volte ad un efficace riduzione
dei rischi e conduzione delle operazioni
militari.
[5] Jama'at Nasr al-Islam
wal Muslimin (JNIM) is a Salafi-jihadist coalition formed in 2017, consisting
of pre-existing jihadist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda, including Ansar Dine,
Al-Mourabitoun, and Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). It
operates in the Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Mali,
Burkina Faso, along the border with Niger, and, in some cases, crossing into
these countries.
[6] Official JNIM platform.
[7] a) Bambara: One of the main ethnic groups in Mali, whose language is used as a lingua franca in some parts of the country, primarily concentrated in the southwestern areas, including the regions of Bamako, Sikasso, Koulikoro, and Ségou.
b) Fulani (or Fula): An ethnic group located in the central regions across many parts of Mali, but particularly concentrated in the central, southern, and eastern regions of the Malian territory, such as Sikasso, Koulikoro, Mopti, and Gao regions.
c) Tuareg and Songhai: The Tuareg are nomadic desert dwellers concentrated in the northern regions of Mali, while the Songhai primarily reside in the Gao region along the Niger River.
d) Dogon, Senufo, and Bella: The Dogon inhabit the Bandiagara cliffs, a mountainous area in central Mali; the Senufo are found in the southwestern regions of Mali, such as Sikasso; the Bella are scattered throughout various parts of Mali.
e) Mande and Arabs: The Mande group
includes various ethnic subgroups such as the Bambara, Malinke, and Soninke,
sharing similarities in terms of language and culture; Arabs are primarily
present in the western regions of the country, near the border with Algeria.
[8] Quoting official JNIM bulletin.
[10] Since late 2020, the tensions between AQ and IS have further deteriorated, especially regarding the groups' propaganda. Among various criticisms, IS accuses local branches and affiliated AQ groups, particularly AQIM and JNIM, of being "apostates."
[11] Attualmente sotto il controllo dei militari a seguito dei 2 Golpi verificatosi ad Agosto 2020 e Maggio 2021.
[12] According to research data, approximately 90% of FAMa operations have been conducted with the support of Wagner units.
